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Abstract
We address simple voting games (SVGs) as mathematical objects in their own
right, and study structures made up of these objects, rather than focusing on
SVGs primarily as co-operative games. To this end it is convenient to employ
the conceptual framework and language of category theory. This enables us
to uncover the underlying unity of the basic operations involving SVGs.
Mathematical Structures
of Simple Voting Games1
1 Introduction
Simple games, the simplest kind of co-operative game studied in game theory,
have been adopted by voting theory – particularly the theory of voting power,
where they are referred to as ‘simple voting games’ (SVGs) – as the simplest
kind of rule for making decisions by vote.
In this paper we address SVGs as mathematical objects in their own
right, a point of view that goes back to Shapley’s 1962 paper [7]; but we
focus primarily on structures made up of these objects. The role of simple
games in game theory proper (concerned with bargaining, coalition formation
etc.) is wholly out of the picture. The use of SVGs as decision rules in voting
theory is kept in the background: it is useful as a heuristic, because the truth
of various propositions about SVGs is easy to see when their interpretation
as decision rules is borne in mind. Also, we conform to widely accepted
terminology derived from game theory (such as ‘game’ and ‘coalition’) and
voting-power theory (such as ‘voter’ and ‘assembly’).
Our main aim here is not to obtain new results, but to set the theory in
the context of mathematics at large, especially the general study of abstract
structures. Hence our use of the conceptual framework and language of
category theory. This enables us to uncover the underlying structural unity
of various operations involving SVGs:
• Composition of SVGs, including the special cases of forming the meet
and join of SVGs.
• Adding dummy voters to an SVG.
• Transforming an SVG by forming voter blocs, whereby coalitions of
voters amalgamate to form new single voters.
• Formation of Boolean subgames, including the special cases of forming
subgames and reduced games.
• Application of an SVG as decision rule to a division of the voters into
“yes” and “no” voters.
1This paper is an edited version of part of the second author’s PhD Thesis, Developing
a Representation of Simple Voting Games within Category Theory, London University,
June 2012, supervised by the first author.
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We show that composition is the most general of these operations, in the
sense that all the others listed above can be construed in a natural way as
special cases of it.
This is preparatory labour, that can serve as launchpad for gaining new
insights and deriving new results – which at the moment is work in progress.
For background on SVGs, the reader is referred to Felsenthal and Ma-
chover [3]. See also Taylor and Zwicker [8]. For the (rather elementary)
prerequisites from category theory the reader may consult any textbook on
the subject, such as the classic Mac Lane [5] or more recent texts such as
McLarty [6] or Awodey [1]. We shall also use some basic results from lattice
theory, for which the reader is referred to Balbes and Dwinger [2]
Since SVGs are the only games we shall consider here, we will from now on
drop this acronym and refer to them simply as ‘games’. Also, throughout
this paper we let V be an arbitrary finite set. We kick off with our first basic
definition.
1.1. Definition A game on V is a pair (V,G), where G is a set of subsets
of V satisfying the following closure upwards condition:
Whenever X ⊆ Y ⊆ V and X ∈ G, then also Y ∈ G.
In this connection, we refer to V as the assembly and to its members as the
voters of the game (V,G). A set of voters (subset of V ) is referred to as
a coalition. A coalition belonging to G is said to be a winning coalition of
(V,G); otherwise it is said to be a losing coalition of this game. If X is a
losing coalition, its complement, V −X, is said to be a blocking coalition of
the game.
For the interpretation of a game as a decision rule, see [3, Rem. 2.1.2(iii)].
The present definition agrees with that of [8] but differs materially from the
conventional one used in voting-power theory – see [3, Def. 2.1.1] – in that
the latter imposes two further conditions: V ∈ G and ∅ 6∈ G.
In view of the upwards closure of G, these further conditions respectively
exclude the trivial cases in which G is empty or the entire power set ℘V of V .
Jointly, these conditions also exclude the degenerate case in which V itself is
empty. These are pretty useless for practical purposes as decision rules;2 but
for our purposes they play a useful role, so we do not exclude them.
2The conventionally excluded cases G = ∅ and G = ℘V respectively yield a stonewalling
rule under which bills are invariably rejected, and a rubber-stamp decision rule under which
bills invariably pass – no matter how the voters divide on them. V = ∅ means that there
are no voters.
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1.2. Definition We denote by LV the structure consisting of the set of all
games on V , with the binary operations join and meet, denoted respectively
by ∨ and ∧, defined as
(1) (V,G) ∨ (V,H) := (V,G ∪ H), (V,G) ∧ (V,H) := (V,G ∩ H);
and binary relation ≤ defined by
(2) (V,G) ≤ (V,H) :⇔ G ⊆ H.
We put:
(3) ⊥V := (V, ∅), >V := (V, ℘V ).
The following result is obvious.
1.3. Theorem LV is a finite (hence complete) distributive lattice, with ≤
as the associated partial ordering and with ⊥V and >V respectively as bottom
(least) and top (greatest) element.
1.4. Remark The operations of join and meet are extended in the obvious
way, so that for any set S of games3 on V , S has a join and meet, denoted
respectively by
∨
S and
∧
S. We shall refer to the members of S as the terms
of the join
∨
S and the factors of the meet
∧
S. In particular, for S = ∅ we
have
(4)
∨
∅ = ⊥V ,
∧
∅ = >V .
1.5. Definition We put
(V,G)∗ := (V, {X ⊆ V : V −X 6∈ G}),
and refer to (V,G)∗ as the dual of (V,G).
From now on we shall often perpetrate a slight abuse of terminology and
notation: we will conflate a game with its set of winning coalitions; and
omitting the first component in ‘(V,G)’, we shall write simply ‘G’.4
The following facts, which are easy to verify, mean that LV , with the
added operation ∗ of duality, is a De Morgan algebra.
3It makes no difference whether S is taken to be an ordered or plain set.
4Note that in any case, except for the trivial ⊥V , the assembly of a game is uniquely
determined by its set of winning coalitions as the largest such coalition.
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1.6. Theorem (i) For any game G on V , G∗ is also a game on V .
(ii) The winning coalitions of G∗ are just the blocking coalitions of G.
(iii) Duality is an involution: G∗∗ = G.
(iv) Duality obeys the De Morgan laws: for any games G and H on V ,
(G ∨ H)∗ = G∗ ∧ H∗, (G ∧ H)∗ = G∗ ∨ H∗.
(v) Duality is order-reversing: G ≤ H⇒ H∗ ≤ G∗.
(vi) In particular, ⊥V ∗ = >V and >V ∗ = ⊥V .
LV may be regarded as a generalized set of truth values. Indeed, L∅ is just
the set of two truth values of classical logic, with duality serving as negation.
For nonempty V, duality does not work as negation – for one thing, there are
self-dual games – but in the interpretation of games as decision rules duality
is in some sense related to negation: see [3, Rem. 2.3.3(iii)]. However, we
will not pursue this connection with logic in the present paper.
Instead, in Section 2 we shall look at lattices of the form LV as structures,
and characterize them among all bounded lattices.
In Section 3 we turn our attention to the category G, whose objects are
the lattices LV for all V, and whose morphisms (aka ‘arrows’) are lattice
homomorphisms. We shall see, in particular, that familiar operations on
games are naturally presented as the action of such morphisms on elements
of their domain objects.
In Section 4 we consider each LV as a category of a simple kind (order cat-
egory). We then single out for each natural number n a ‘canonical’ Lbn whose
assembly n̂ has cardinality n, and describe a recursive category-theoretic
construction of the Lbn.
Finally, in Section 5, moving away from the viewpoint (inherited from
game theory) that focuses on winning, and looking at games in terms of
losing coalitions, we shall be able to make a connection between the present
theory and a branch of combinatorics related to topology.
2 Characterization of the LV
We start by restating the definitions of various concepts from the theory of
voting power. An asterisk in the label of a clause indicates duality.
2.1. Definition Let G be a game on V .
(i) A minimal winning coalition (MWC) of G is a winning coalition of G that
does not include any other winning coalition of G.
(i*) A minimal blocking coalition (MBC) of G is a blocking coalition of G
that does not include any other blocking coalition of G.
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(ii) If v is a voter such that the singleton {v} is a blocking coalition of G,
then v is said to be a vetoer 5 in G.
(ii*) If v is a voter such that the singleton {v} is a winning coalition of G,
then v is said to be a passer in G.
(iii) A dictator in G is a voter that is both a vetoer and a passer in G. A
game that has a dictator is said to be a dictatorial game.
(iv) A dummy in G is a voter v such that for every losing coalition X of G,
X ∪ {v} is also a losing coalition of G.
The following facts are easily established.
2.2. Proposition Let G be a game on V .
(i) G is uniquely determined by its set of MWCs. Moreover, if M is any set
of coalitions (ie, subsets of V ) then M is the set of MWCs of some game iff
no member of M is included in another member of M.
(ii) Every MWC of G is an MBC of G∗, and vice versa.
(iii) Every vetoer in G is a passer in G∗, and vice versa.
(iv) A dictator in G is also a dictator in G∗.
(v) Voter v is a dictator in G iff {v} is the sole MWC of G. Hence there can
be at most one dictator in G.
(vi) Voter v is a dummy in G iff v does not belong to any MWC of G.
(vii) A dummy in G is also a dummy in G∗.
We proceed to define games of a special kind that serve as building blocks
for all games on V .
2.3. Definition (i) For any A ⊆ V we denote by (V, bAc) the game on V
that has A as its sole MWC:
(V, bAc) := (V, {X : A ⊆ X ⊆ V }).
We call (V, bAc) the principal game on V determined by A.
(i*) We call the game on V that has A as its sole MBC – namely, the dual
(V, bAc)∗ of (V, bAc) – the prime game on V determined by A.
As before, where there is no risk of confusion we shall abuse notation and
terminology and omit reference to V . Thus we shall write ‘bAc’, ‘bAc∗’ and
b{v}c instead of ‘(V, bAc)’, ‘(V, bAc)∗’ and ‘(V, b{v}c)’.
As we shall see in a moment, the terms ‘principal’ and ‘prime’ are justified
by the algebraic properties of these games in the lattice LV .
5Sometimes also called a blocker.
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2.4. Proposition (i) In the principal game bAc all members of A are veto-
ers, and all other voters are dummies.
(i*) In the prime game bAc∗ all members of A are passers, and all other
voters are dummies.
(ii) For any v ∈ V , b{v}c is self-dual, hence it is both principal and prime.
Conversely, a game that is both principal and prime must be of the form
b{v}c for some v ∈ V . Moreover, in b{v}c v is dictator and all other voters
are dummies.
(iii) Any game G on V can be presented as a join of a set of pairwise incom-
parable principal games:
(1) G =
k∨
i=1
bAic,where k ≥ 0 and i 6= j ⇒ Ai 6⊆ Aj.
Moreover, this presentation is unique (up to the order of the Ai).
(iv) If G =
∨k
i=1bAic and H =
∨m
i=1bBic are such presentations of games G
and H, then G ≤ H iff for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) there is a j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) such
that Bj ⊆ Ai.
(v) A game G on V is principal iff G 6= ⊥V and G is not the join of strictly
smaller games: G = H ∨ K⇒ G = H or G = K.
(v*) A game G on V is prime iff G 6= >V and G is not the meet of strictly
larger games: G = H ∧ K⇒ G = H or G = K.
Proof (i) follows at once from Def. 2.1(ii)&(iv) and Def. 2.3(i).
(i*) follows from (i) by duality.
(ii): The self-duality of b{v}c follows from the fact that its winning coalitions
and blocking coalitions are the same, namely those subsets of V that contain
v. Hence b{v}c, which is principal, equals b{v}c∗, which is prime.
Conversely, if the principal game bAc is not of the form b{v}c, then either
A = ∅ or A has at least two members. But b∅c = >V and is not prime because
its dual, ⊥V = ∅, is not principal. On the other hand, if A has two distinct
members, say v1 and v2, then by (i) both of them must be vetoers in bAc.
Hence both {v1} and {v2} are MBCs of bAc, so it cannot be prime. That v
is dictator in b{v}c follows from Prop. 2.2(v).
(iii) follows at once from Def. 2.1(i), Prop. 2.2(i) and Def. 2.3(i). The Ai in
(1) are just the MWCs of G.
Note, in particular, that in the presentation (1) if G = ⊥V , then k = 0;
and if G = >V then k = 1 and A1 = ∅.
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(iv): Observe that by Def. 1.2(2), G ≤ H means that every winning coalition
of G is also a winning coalition of H. Clearly, this holds iff every MWC of G
includes an MWC of H.
(v) Suppose G is a principal game on V . Thus G = bAc for some A ⊆ V .
Clearly, bAc 6= ⊥V . If bAc = H ∨ K, then bAc ≥ H and bAc ≥ K. We must
show that the sharp inequalities bAc > H and bAc > K cannot both hold.
If bAc > H, then there must exist some X such that A ⊆ X ⊆ V but X
is a losing coalition of H. Similarly, if bAc > K, then there must exist some
Y such that A ⊆ Y ⊆ V but Y is a losing coalition of K. Hence A ⊆ X ∩ Y
but X ∩ Y is a losing coalition of H ∨ K – contrary to our assumption that
bAc = H ∨ K.
Conversely, suppose that the game G is not principal. If G = ⊥V , we have
nothing to prove. If G 6= ⊥V , then G must have at least two MWCs. Thus,
in the presentation (1) k ≥ 2. Hence G = bA1c∨
∨k
i=2bAic, which shows that
G is the join of two strictly smaller games.
(v*) follows from (v) by duality.
While Prop. 2.4(iii) shows that the principal games can serve as building
blocks for all games on V , we shall now show that the dictatorial games are
the ultimate components of all these games.
First observe that any principal game bAc can be presented as a meet of
dictatorial games:
bAc =
∧
x∈A
b{x}c.
Moreover, this presentation is unique (up to the order of the dictatorial
games). And if bAc = ∧R and bBc = ∧ S, where R and S are sets of
dictatorial games, then
B ⊆ A⇔ bAc ≤ bBc ⇔ S ⊆ R.
In view of this observation, Prop. 2.4(iii)&(iv) yields the following theorem.
2.5. Theorem (i) Any game G on V can be presented as
G =
k∨
i=1
∧
Ri, where k ≥ 0 and each Ri is a set of dictatorial games
such that i 6= j ⇒ Ri 6⊆ Rj.
(2)
Moreover, this presentation is unique (up to the order of the Ri and the order
of the dictatorial games in each Ri).
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(ii) if G =
∨k
i=1
∧
Ri and H =
∨m
i=1
∧
Si are such presentations of games G
and H, then G ≤ H iff for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) there is a j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) such
that Sj ⊆ Ri.
We shall refer to the right-hand side of (2) as the join normal form (JNF)
of G, in analogy with the disjunctive normal form of propositional logic.
Obviously, the dual of Thm. 2.5 yields a meet normal form (MNF) for
each game on V .
2.6. Remark In view of Proposition 2.2(vi), voter v is a dummy in G iff
b{v}c does not occur in the JNF of G.
Thm. 2.5 means that the dictatorial games in LV constitute a set of
independent generators, or a basis, of LV .
The following corollary of Thm. 2.5 uses the existence (but not the unique-
ness) of a JNF.
2.7. Corollary (Proof by structural induction) To prove that all games
on V possess a property P, it is sufficient to show that ⊥V , >V and all
dictatorial games on V possess P; and that whenever games G and H on V
both possess P, then so do G ∨ H and G ∧ H.
Thm. 2.5 provides the following structural characterization of the LV
among all bounded lattices.
2.8. Theorem Let L be a bounded lattice. Suppose there are n elements in
L – call them ‘atoms’ – such that any element g of L can be presented in the
form
g =
k∨
i=1
∧
Ri, where k ≥ 0 and each Ri is a set of atoms
such that i 6= j ⇒ Ri 6⊆ Rj.
(3)
And suppose moreover that whenever g =
∨k
i=1
∧
Ri and h =
∨m
i=1
∧
Si are
such presentations of elements g and h of L, then g ≤ h iff for each i (1 ≤
i ≤ k) there is a j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) such that Sj ⊆ Ri.
Then L is isomorphic (in the category of all bounded lattices) to LV with
|V | = n.
Proof First, note that because of the condition regarding g ≤ h, the pre-
sentation (3) is unique: simply apply this condition to the case g = h.
Now let |V | = n, and map the set of n atoms of L bijectively onto the
set of dictatorial games on V . Extend the map to the whole of L in the
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obvious way via the presentations (3) and (2). This extended map is clearly
a bijection of L onto LV ; and it respects the bottom and top elements of
these lattices as well as the ordering on them, and hence also the join and
meet operations.
For clarification it is worth pointing out that in any lattice the sufficiency of
the condition for g ≤ h in Thm. 2.8 holds without any special assumptions
regarding the Ri and Si: they do not have to be incomparable with respect
to inclusion, nor do their members need to be ‘atoms’. In other words, we
have the following easily established fact:
2.9. Proposition Let L be a lattice. Let g =
∨k
i=1
∧
Ri and h =
∨m
i=1
∧
Si be
elements of L and suppose that for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) there is a j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
such that Sj ⊆ Ri. Then g ≤ h.
3 The category G
In this section we shall study the category G whose objects are the lattices
LV for all finite sets V , and whose morphisms, or arrows, are bounded lattice
homomorphisms: maps between these objects that respect bottom and top
elements and the operations of join and meet. More formally:
3.1. Definition A morphism, or arrow, of the category G is a map
f : LV → LW ,
where V and W are any finite sets, such that
f : ⊥V 7→ ⊥W , f : >V 7→ >W ,
and for all G and H in LV
f(G ∨ H) = fG ∨ fH, f(G ∧ H) = fG ∧ fH.
In this connection we say that LV and LW are respectively the domain of f ,
briefly dom f , and its codomain, briefly cod f .
These maps necessarily respect the ordering (which is uniquely determined
by the lattice operations); in other words, they are monotone. On the other
hand, we do not require them to respect duality; but of course those that do
are of special interest.
Several results obtained in the present section have the following form:
an operation that is commonly applied to games in voting theory (where
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the games are used as decision rules) can be conceptualized as the ‘natural’
action of some morphism f of G on elements of dom f . In other words,
operations that voting theory applies to individual games are, so to speak,
the uniform retail effects of a wholesale morphism, a template, acting on an
LV .
The following result is a useful starting point for defining morphisms in
G.
3.2. Main Lemma Let f be an arbitrary map from the set {b{v}c : v ∈ V }
of all dictatorial games in LV into LW . Then f has a unique extension to a
morphism f : LV → LW of G given, for every G on V , by
(1) fG = {Y ⊆ W : {x ∈ V : Y ∈ fb{x}c} ∈ G} .
Proof Observe that, for all v ∈ V and all Y ⊆ W ,
Y ∈ fb{v}c ⇔ v ∈ {x ∈ V : Y ∈ fb{x}c}
⇔ {x ∈ V : Y ∈ fb{x}c} ∈ b{v}c.
Now let us extend f to the whole of LV by stipulating that the same holds
for any G ∈ LV :
(2) ∀Y ⊆ W : Y ∈ fG⇔ {x ∈ V : Y ∈ fb{x}c} ∈ G.
In other words, we extend f by taking (1) as the definition of fG for any
G ∈ LV .
It is easy to verify that fG so defined satisfies the upward closure condition
of Def. 1.1 and is therefore a game on W . And using (2) it is also easy to
check that the extended f respects the bottom and top elements and the
operations of meet and join. Thus it is a morphism of G.
To prove the uniqueness of the extended f , suppose that f ′ : LV → LW
and that f ′ agrees with f on {b{v}c : v ∈ V }. Then by routine structural
induction on G (Cor. 2.7) it follows that f ′ coincides with f on the whole of
LV .
Along with Lemma 3.2 we have the following characterization of duality-
respecting morphisms.
3.3. Theorem A morphism f : LV → LW of G respects duality iff for every
v ∈ V , fb{v}c is self-dual in LW .
Proof The condition is clearly necessary, because the b{v}c are self-dual
(Prop. 2.4(ii)).
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For the converse, suppose all the fb{v}c are self-dual. It follows easily
by structural induction (Cor. 2.7) that f(G∗) = (fG)∗ for all G ∈ LV .
Let us now go back to Def. 3.1 and relate it to an operation on games used
in the theory of voting power.
Observe that by Lemma 3.2 the fb{v}c can be chosen arbitrarily as any
games on W , and the morphism f uniquely determined by this choice then
satisfies (1) for any game G on V . Thus a morphism f : LV → LW yields
some kind of operation involving an arbitrary game G on V and n games
fb{v}c on W , where n = |V |.
To work out what operation this is, it will be convenient to introduce the
following definition (which will also be much needed in Section 4).
3.4. Definition For any natural number n, we put n̂ := {1, 2, . . . , n}, and
refer to n̂ as the canonical assembly of size n. In particular, 0̂ = ∅.
There is no real loss of generality if we let Lbn here stand in for any LV with
|V | = n, which is of course isomorphic to Lbn. But one advantage of using
Lbn is that its canonical assembly comes with a ready-made ordering. So let
us rewrite (2) for the case where V = n̂ and f : Lbn → LW , and let us put
Hi := fb{i}c for all i ∈ n̂. We obtain
(3) ∀Y ⊆ W : Y ∈ fG⇔ {i ∈ n̂ : Y ∈ Hi} ∈ G.
Referring to Felsenthal and Machover [3, Def. 2.3.12], we see that (3) means
that fG is the composite of H1,H2, . . . ,Hn (in this order) under G; or, using
the notation of [3, Def. 2.3.12]:
fG = G[H1,H2, . . . ,Hn].
For the use of G[H1,H2, . . . ,Hn] to model a ‘federal’ or two-tier voting system,
see [3, Rem. 2.3.13(ii)].
The definition of G[H1,H2, . . . ,Hn] in [3] is apparently more general, in
that it allows the Hi to have different assemblies, and the assembly of the
composite G[H1,H2, . . . ,Hn] is then the union of these n assemblies; whereas
here all the Hi are games on the same assembly, W . But that apparent
greater generality is not essential: as we shall see later (Rem. 3.9 below), any
LW can be embedded (in a sense to be made precise) in LW ′ , where W
′ is
any finite superset of W . Hence LWi , where i ∈ n̂, can all be embedded in
LW , where W =
⋃n
i=1Wi.
So, ignoring the minor and superficial differences between (2) and the
definition of game composition in [3] – namely, that the V in (2) is not
necessarily canonical; and that the definition in [3] allows the Hi to have
11
different assemblies – it transpires that any morphism f : LV → LW acts on
any game G on V by forming the composite of the arbitrarily chosen games
{fb{x}c : x ∈ V } under G.
This is an important insight, because it shows that composition, far from
being a rather specialized operation on games, is a very general one. Indeed,
we shall see that particular kinds of morphisms of G yield various operations
on games that are familiar from the theory of voting power. These operations
therefore turn out to be special cases of composition. This applies not only
to fairly obvious operations such as taking the meet or join of several games
– which are noted as special cases of composition in [3, Def. 2.3.12] – but
also to rather less obvious cases.
An important class of morphisms of G, which we now proceed to define, are
induced in a natural way by mappings between assemblies.
3.5. Definition Let ϕ : V → W be an arbitrary map from V to the finite
set W . The morphism Lϕ : LV → LW induced by ϕ is defined by putting,
for all v ∈ V ,
(4) (Lϕ)b{v}c := b{ϕv}c.
Note that by Lemma 3.2 this defines Lϕ uniquely.
3.6. Theorem Let ϕ and Lϕ be as in Def. 3.5. Then
(i) For all G ∈ LV , LϕG = {Y ⊆ W : ϕ−1[Y ] ∈ G}.
(ii) Lϕ respects duality.
(iii) If w ∈ W − ϕ[V ] (ie, w ∈ W but not in the range of ϕ), then for any
G ∈ LV w is a dummy in LϕG.
Proof (i) Substituting Lϕ for f in (1) and using (4) we have
LϕG = {Y ⊆ W : {v ∈ V : Y ∈ b{ϕv}c} ∈ G}
= {Y ⊆ W : {v ∈ V : ϕv ∈ Y } ∈ G}
= {Y ⊆ W : ϕ−1[Y ] ∈ G}.
(ii) follows from Thm. 3.3 and Prop. 2.4(ii).
To prove (iii), write G in JNF:
G =
k∨
i=1
∧
x∈Ai
b{x}c, where i 6= j ⇒ Ai 6⊆ Aj.
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Hence by (4)
LϕG =
k∨
i=1
∧
x∈Ai
b{ϕx}c.
This may not be the JNF of LϕG, because ϕ need not be injective. However,
the JNF of LϕG can be obtained from it by eliminating duplication and
redundancy. It follows that the JNF of LϕG contains only dictatorial games
of the form b{ϕx}c. Therefore by Rem. 2.6, if w is not in the range of ϕ it
must be a dummy in LϕG.
It is easy to see that if
U
ψ−−−→ V ϕ−−−→ W
then L(ϕψ) = LϕLψ. Thus Def. 3.5 yields a functor L from the category
FinSet of finite sets to G. This is stated more precisely and fully in the
following theorem.
3.7. Theorem For any V , let LV := LV and for any mapping ϕ between
finite sets let Lϕ be as defined in Def. 3.5. Then L : FinSet → G is a
faithful functor from FinSet to G.
The case in which ϕ : V → W is injective is of special importance. The
following facts are easily established.
3.8. Theorem Let W be a finite set, and let ϕ : V → W be an injective
map. Then Lϕ : LV → LW is a subobject of LW in G.
Also, the image Lϕ[LV ] of LV is a sublattice of LW , isomorphic to LV .
3.9. Remark If V ⊆ W and ϕ : V ↪→ W is the insertion map, then Lϕ[LV ]
is essentially a replica of LV . If G is any game on V , then G and its image
LϕG have formally exactly the same JNF. Of course, this expression and the
factors occurring in it do not denote exactly the same games on W as they
do on V : if v ∈ V , the members (ie winning coalitions) of b{v}c as a game
on W may include extra elements, belonging to W −V . But by Thm. 3.6(iii)
all these extra elements are dummies in LϕG; and for all practical purposes –
as well as in applications in voting-power theory – addition of dummies does
not essentially alter a game, since they play no active role in it and are, as it
were, mere spectators. So we may regard LϕG as essentially a replica of G.
Thus if we wish to operate on games Hi, where i ∈ n̂, with different
respective assemblies Wi, we can always embed these assemblies in their
union W =
⋃n
i=1Wi, and operate on replicas of the Hi, which have W as
their common assembly.
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3.10. Theorem L has a right adjoint, namely the forgetful functor
F : G→ FinSet.
Proof Let V and L be variables ranging over the objects of FinSet and G
respectively. It is enough to exhibit a family of isomorphisms
ΦV,L : homG(LV , L) ∼= homFinSet(V, FL)
that is natural in both V and L.
Lemma 3.2 provides us with such a family of isomorphisms: it tells us
that a unique f ∈ homG(LV , L) is determined by an arbitrary choice of
fb{v}c ∈ FL for all v ∈ V. We define ΦV,Lf ∈ homFinSet(V, FL) by putting
(ΦV,Lf)v := fb{v}c for all v ∈ V.
It is easy to see that ΦV,L is the required family of isomorphisms.
3.11. Corollary G has has all colimits: it has an initial object; any two
objects have a coproduct; any two parallel arrows have a coequalizer and any
corner of arrows has a pushout.
Proof We know (see, for example, McLarty [6, Ex. 10.11]) that a left-adjoint
functor respects all small colimits. But L is the left adjoint of the forgetful
functor F , and is bijective on objects. Since FinSet has all colimits, G also
has them. The remaining parts of our corollary follow as they refer to special
cases of colimits.
Thus, for example, as ∅ is the initial object of FinSet, L∅ is the initial
object of G. As another example, let V and W be disjoint finite sets, and
let ϕ : V → V ∪W and ψ : W → V ∪W be the respective insertions of V
and W into V ∪W . Then
V
ϕ−−−→ V ∪W ψ←−−− W
is a coproduct diagram in FinSet; and
LV
Lϕ−−−→ LV ∪W Lψ←−−− LW
is a the corresponding coproduct diagram in G.
3.12. Remark From Lemma 3.2 it follows that G has no terminal object,
because if V 6= ∅ and W is an arbitrary finite set, there is more than one way
of choosing the fb{v}c in LW . However, G has a subcategory GD, whose
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objects are the same as those of G and whose morphisms are the duality-
respecting morphisms of G. L∅ is clearly also an initial object of GD. And
from Thm. 3.3 it follows that if V is a singleton then LV is a terminal object
of GD, because in this case LV has just one self-dual game (which is the sole
non-trivial game on V ).
Returning to Def. 3.5, we will now show that if ϕ : V → W is an arbitrary
map from V to the finite set W , then the application of the induced morphism
Lϕ to any game G in LV yields a game in LW that arises from G by bloc
formation.
The operation of bloc formation is defined formally by Felsenthal and
Machover [3, Def. 2.3.23] for the special case where just one bloc is formed:
members of a coalition of voters S ⊆ V amalgamate and henceforth vote as
one. This creates a new single bloc voter, which is denoted by &S in [3],
that replaces all the members of S in V , thus resulting in a new assembly,
(V − S) ∪ {&S}, and a new game on this assembly.
This operation of forming a single bloc has an obvious generalization,
whereby several blocs are formed simultaneously or successively by mutually
disjoint coalitions. In fact, taking any finite W as an index set, we can
consider an arbitrary partition {Sw : w ∈ W} of V into disjoint sets Sw, such
that V =
⋃
w∈W Sw, and replace all the voters in each Sw by a new single
bloc voter, whom we take to be w. (Thus we are using w as proxy for &Sw .)
Note that some of the Sw may be singletons; so our general bloc formation
embraces also the case where some voters in V do not amalgamate with other
voters but remain single. For even greater generality, we allow some of the
Sw to be empty,
6 so that the corresponding blocs are degenerate.
Let G be any game on V and let G′ be the game on W resulting from
G by this simultaneous bloc formation. What are the members (ie, winning
coalitions) of G′? A straightforward extension of the definition in [3, Def.
2.3.23] to the present setting leads to the following definition:
(5) G′ := {Y ⊆ W :
⋃
w∈Y
Sw ∈ G}.
Now, specifying an arbitrary partition {Sw : w ∈ W} of V (in the present
permissive sense) is equivalent to specifying an arbitrary map ϕ : V → W ,
where Sw = ϕ
−1[{w}] for each w ∈ W . Rewriting (5) in terms of ϕ, we have
G′ := {Y ⊆ W : ϕ−1[Y ] ∈ G}.
6This is not normally allowed by the usual definition of the term partition, but here
it is convenient to relax this restriction; among other things, it allows us to apply the
operation to the degenerate empty assembly.
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Therefore by Thm. 3.6(i), G′ = LϕG. Note also that Sw is empty iff w is not
in the range of ϕ – in which case it follows from Thm. 3.6(iii) that w is a
dummy in LϕG. Thus we have the following result.
3.13. Theorem Let ϕ : V → W be an arbitrary map from V to the finite set
W and let G be any game on V . Then LϕG is the game on W resulting from
G by formation of the blocs {ϕ−1[{w}] : w ∈ W}. Moreover, if w ∈ W −ϕ[V ]
(ie, the bloc ϕ−1[{w}] is degenerate) then w is a dummy in LϕG.
We now turn to another class of morphisms of G, which – except for de-
generate cases – do not respect duality, and therefore cannot be induced by
morphisms of FinSet.
3.14. Definition Let T and B be disjoint subsets of V and let W = V −
(T ∪B). We define a morphism @TB : LV → LW by putting
@TB b{v}c :=

>W if v ∈ T ,
⊥W if v ∈ B,
b{v}c on W if v ∈ W .
Note that here b{v}c on the left-hand side is a game on V , which in non-
sloppy notation should be written as (V, b{v}c); whereas the b{v}c on the
right-hand side (third case) is a game on W , written more properly as
(W, b{v}c).
3.15. Theorem For all G ∈ LV ,
(6) @TBG = {Y ⊆ W : Y ∪ T ∈ G};
(7) @TB (G∗) = (@BT G)∗.
Proof Routine, by structural induction on G (Cor. 2.7).7
3.16. Remark Equation (6) means that @TBG is what Taylor and Zwicker [8,
Def. 1.4.4] call the Boolean subgame of G determined by B and T .
The special case @∅BG is the subgame of G determined by V − B, which
they denote by GB.
The special case @T∅ G is the reduced game of G determined by V − T ,
which they denote by GT .
Heuristically, it is helpful to keep in mind the meaning of @TBG as a
decision rule. Suppose G is a decision rule with V as its set of voters. Suppose
7Equation (6) can also be deduced directly from (1).
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also that voters belonging to subsets T and B of V are committed in advance
to voting “yes” and “no” respectively, come what may. When a bill is put to
the vote, the outcome will then depend only on the votes of the remaining
voters, members of W = V − (T ∪ B). We are left with a decision rule with
W as the de facto set of voters. This rule is precisely @TBG.
For further details see [8, pp. 21–23].
3.17. Remark A particularly important special case of Def. 3.14 is that
in which W is empty. In this case we have a morphism f : LV → L∅. This
morphism corresponds to a partition of V into two sets, T and B, such that
fb{v}c = >∅ or ⊥∅ according as v ∈ T or v ∈ B.
Where games are interpreted as decision rules, this partition is essentially
what Felsenthal and Machover [3, Def. 2.1.5] call a bipartition, a division of
the assembly V into “yes” and “no” voters – members of T andB respectively.
It is then easy to show by structural induction that, for any game G on V ,
fG represents the outcome of the bipartition corresponding to f under the
decision rule G; thus fG = >∅ or ⊥∅ according as the proposed bill is passed
or blocked.
4 The categories LV and a skeleton of G
If |V | = |W | = n, then the objects LV and LW are isomorphic in the category
G. In fact, it follows from Lemma 3.2 that there are exactly n! isomorphisms
between them, because the dictatorial (ie, principal and prime) games on V
must map bijectively to the dictatorial games on W .
Choosing Lbn (see Def. 3.4) as the canonical representative of this iso-
morphism type, we obtain a skeleton of G: a full subcategory of G, whose
objects are the Lbn for all natural n.
In this section we shall present a recursive category-theoretic construction
of the Lbn; but in preparation for this we first need to observe that each LV
– and in particular each Lbn – being a partially ordered set, can be regarded
as a category of a very simple kind: for any games G and H on V , an arrow
G → H exists iff G ≤ H, in which case this arrow is unique. In this context
we write G→ H not only to denote this arrow but also to state that it exists,
in other words that G ≤ H. This ambiguity should not cause any confusion.
Here is a brief re´sume´ of the basic facts about the category LV .
• All diagrams in LV commute.
• ⊥V and >V are respectively the initial and terminal objects of LV .
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• Products and coproducts exist, with
G← G ∧ H→ H and G→ G ∨ H← H
respectively as product and coproduct diagrams.
• As LV is a De Morgan algebra, the duality operation ∗ is a contravariant
functor mapping LV to its opposite, LV
op.
Now let us return to the Lbn. Consider two special cases of Thm. 3.15, in both
of which V = n̂+ 1 and W = n̂. In the first case we put B = {n + 1} and
T = ∅; and in the second case we put T = {n + 1} and B = ∅. We obtain
for any game G in Ln̂+1 the following two games in Lbn:
@∅{n+1}G = {Y ⊆ n̂ : Y ∈ G},
@{n+1}∅ G = {Y ⊆ n̂ : Y ∪ {n+ 1} ∈ G}.
The upwards closure of G implies that in the category Lbn
@∅{n+1}G −→@{n+1}∅ G.
Thus we have a map from objects in Ln̂+1 to arrows in Lbn. This map is
bijective. Indeed, given any arrow G→ G in Lbn, we put
G := G ∪ {Y ∪ {n+ 1} : Y ∈ G}.
Then it is straightforward to verify that
G =@∅{n+1}G and G =@
{n+1}
∅ G.
Moreover, this map is functorial. Indeed, if G → H is any arrow in Ln̂+1,
then in Lbn we have the commutative diagram:
@∅{n+1}G −−−→ @{n+1}∅ Gy y
@∅{n+1}H −−−→ @{n+1}∅ H
Thus Ln̂+1 is essentially (ie, canonically isomorphic to) the category of ar-
rows of Lbn. Another way of putting it is that Ln̂+1 is the functor category
Funct(Lb0,Lbn). (Recall that Lb0 is our old L∅, now seen as the category with
a single non-identity arrow, which is commonly denoted by 2.)
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The canonical isomorphism (in the category of bounded lattices) from the
category of arrows of Lbn to Ln̂+1 is easy to figure out. According to Thm. 2.8
we need only specify the arrows of Lbn that correspond to the dictatorial
games on n̂+ 1. And it is easy to see that for i = 1, 2, . . . , n the identity
arrow b{i}c → b{i}c in Lbn corresponds to the dictatorial game b{i}c on
n̂+ 1, whereas ⊥bn → >bn corresponds to the dictatorial game b{n+ 1}c.
To sum up: starting with the category Lb0 (commonly known as 2), we
obtain all the Lbn recursively in the sense that Ln̂+1 is canonically isomorphic
to the functor category Funct(Lb0,Lbn).
5 Losing a game and gaining insight
Games are played to win, and game theory accordingly focuses on winning,
which it privileges over losing. Voting-power theory inherited this bias, and
we have also followed this convention so far, referring to a game (V,G) in
terms of its assembly V and set G of winning coalitions (Def. 1.1).8 However,
it would be equally possible to refer to a game in terms of its assembly and
set of losing coalitions.
Note that if (in the notation of Def. 1.1) (V,G) is a game, then its set
℘V − G of losing coalitions is closed downwards :
Y ⊆ X ∈ ℘V − G⇒ Y ∈ ℘V − G.
Conversely, if C is a downwards closed set of subsets of V , then it is the
set of losing coalitions of a unique game on V , namely (V, ℘V − C). This
legitimizes the following definition.
5.1. Definition For any downwards closed set C of subsets of V , we put
〈V,C〉 := (V, ℘V − C).
In other words, we introduce ‘〈V,C〉’ as a synonym for ‘(V, ℘V − C)’. We
use angled brackets to distinguish the new notation from the old one.
Note that we cannot use a sloppy version of the new notation: whereas –
except for the trivial case of ⊥V – a game’s set of winning coalitions uniquely
determines its assembly (as its biggest member), no such thing holds for the
set of losing coalitions.
8For reasons that will soon become clear, we avoid in this section the sloppy practice
of conflating a game with its set of winning coalitions, and insist on the strict notation of
Def. 1.1.
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Note also that if we wish to stick to the operations and ordering of Def. 1.1,
then
〈V,C〉 ∨ 〈V,D〉 = 〈V,C ∩ D〉, 〈V,C〉 ∧ 〈V,D〉 = 〈V,C ∪ D〉;
and
〈V,C〉 ≤ 〈V,D〉 ⇔ D ⊆ C.
An advantage of this representation of games is that it reveals a communi-
cating door between the theory of games as decision rules and a branch of
combinatorics concerned with abstract simplicial complexes.
In the latter theory – which is closely related to combinatorial topology9
– an abstract simplicial complex (briefly: complex ) is a set C of sets that is
closed downwards. Here we shall admit ∅ as a trivial complex. The union
set
⋃
C is the set of vertices of C. Thus a vertex of C is any member of a
member of C.
A special case is the power set ℘V of the finite set V . This complex is an
abstract simplex (briefly: simplex ) with V as its set of vertices. Its dimension
is defined as dim℘V := |V |−1, because the usual geometric realization of ℘V
is as a (|V |− 1)-dimensional Euclidean simplex. For example, if |V | = 4, ℘V
is realized as a tetrahedron. This has the somewhat awkward consequence
that in the case V = ∅, which we shall admit, dim℘V = −1; but we can live
with this.
Thus the lattice LV is identical with the lattice of all sub-complexes of
the simplex ℘V (with their order of inclusion reversed). The voters are the
vertices of that simplex, and the coalitions are its faces. The duality ∗ is the
well-known Alexander duality.
Some of the concepts defined in Section 2 assume a particularly simple
and easily visualizable form in this guise; for example:
• A passer in a game 〈V,C〉 is a member of V (ie vertex of ℘V ) that is
not a vertex of C.
• The prime game on V determined by the coalition/face A is
(V, bAc)∗ = 〈V, ℘(V − A)〉.
This is the sub-simplex ℘(V − A) of the simplex ℘V. Its dimension is
|V − A| − 1.
• In particular, the dictatorial game (V, b{v}c) = 〈V, ℘(V − {v})〉 is the
sub-simplex whose set of vertices is V − {v}. Its dimension is |V | − 2;
in other words, it is a maximal proper sub-simplex of ℘V.
9See, for example, Lee [4].
20
• The principal game on V determined by the coalition/face A is
(V, bAc) = 〈V,
⋃
v∈A
℘(V − {v})〉.
It is a union of maximal proper sub-simplexes of ℘V.
This connection between the theory of games as decision rules and the theory
of finite abstract simplicial complexes allows a transfer of ideas and results
from one to the other. This is a jumping off point for further research, and
is work in progress.
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